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HOMER A. NORRIS et aI., Respondents, v. SAN MATEO 
COUNTY TITLE COMPANY (a Corporation), Defend-
ant; EMIL J. RIBARSKY et aI., Appellants. 
[1] Judgments-Res Judicata.-A judgment which has become 
final is conclusive as to the rights of the parties on the issues 
litigated. (Code Civ. Proc., §l908.) 
[2] Vendor and Purchaser-Recovery by Vendor of Purchase 
JllIoney.-Where title to a down payment held by a title com-
pany was not adjudicated in a prior action between the parties 
to a real estate transaction in which it was determined that 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 395; [2,4,5] Vendor 
and Purchaser, § 297; [3] Escrows, § 10; [6J Vendol' and Purchuu, 
1306. 
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Bone of the parties was entitled to recover from any of the 
others, whoever had title to the down payment at the time of 
the prior action is entitled to recover it from the title company. 
[8] Escrows - Performance of Conditions. - Under the standard 
form of escrow instructions, which provide for the exchange 
of money and a deed on stipulated conditions, the vendee re-
tains title to the money until the conditions have been per-
formed. 
[4] Vendor and Purchaser-RecovelJ by Vendor of Purchase 
MoneY.-Where a down payment under a contract for purchase 
of realty is not deposited in escrow by the vcndef!s pursuant 
to escrow instructions, but is paid to the vendors' ag"l:nts pur-
suant to a deposit receipt as the initial payment to the vendors 
in performance of the contract, title to such payment vests in 
the vendors when they accept the contract. 
[5] Id.-RecovelJ by Vendor of Purchase Money.-Where title to 
a down payment under a contract for purchase of realty :'1 
vested in the vendors, and any right to recover the excess of 
the down payment over the damages caused by the vendceli 
breach is foreclosed by a previous judgment, the vendors may 
retain the entire down payment. 
[6] Id.-RecovelJ by Vendor of Purchase Money-Judgment.-In 
an action to recover a down payment made by the vendees in 
a real estate transaction and deposited with a title company, 
a personal judgment against the vendees is erroneous where the 
right of the vendors to recover anything from the vendees has 
been foreclosed by a previous judgment. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Mateo County and from an order granting a summary judg-
ment. Edmund Scott, Judge. Modified and affirmed. 
Action for money had and received. Summary judgment 
for plaintiffs modified and affirmed. 
P. H. McCarthy, Jr., F. Nason O'Hara and Herbert So 
Johnson for Appellants. 
Norman S. Menifee for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs brought this action against the 
San Mateo County Title Company and defendants Ribarsky 
to recover a $2,000 down payment made by the Ribarskys 
under a contract for the purchase of real property from plain-
[3] See 10 Oal.Jur. 589; 19 Am.Jur. 426. 
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tiffs Norris. The down payment was paid to plaintiffs Keeler 
and Chance, the Norriscs' agents in negotiating the sale of 
the property. The agents deposited the down payment with 
the escrow holder, San Mateo County Title Company. The 
trial court entered summary judgment for plaintiffs based on 
the affidavit of plaintiff Chance and the judgment roll of a 
prcvious action between the parties. It was stipulated that 
the trial court could consider the judgment roll in ruling 
upon the motion for summary judgment. Defendants Ribar-
sky have appealed. 
The affidavit in support of the motion for summary judg-
ment avers the following facts: Defendants Ribarsky signed 
a deposit receipt in which they agreed to purchase the prop-
erty for $20,000. They paid $2,000 down and agreed to pay 
the balance within 45 days. Plaintiffb Norris accepted the 
contract and agreed to pay plaintiffs Keeler and Chance a 
5 per cent commission, or in the event of default, one half 
the down payment. The deposit receipt provided that "In 
case said purchaser shall fail to pay the remainder of said 
purchase price or complete said purchase as herein provided, 
the amounts paid hereon shall, at the option of the Seller be 
retained as liquidated damages." Plaintiff Chance deposited 
the down payment I with the San Mateo County Title Company, 
pursuant to authorization of defendants Ribarsky, together 
with a deed "duly executed by plaintiffs NORRIS and escrow 
in!'ltructions in conformity with the aforesaid deposit receipt 
duly executed by plaintiffs NORRIS." Plaintiffs Norris com-
plied with all the terms and conditions of the deposit receipt, 
but defendants Ribarsky refused to make any further payment 
under the contract. The affidavit concludes "That said sum 
of Two-Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) remains and is on de-
posit with defendant SAN MATEO COUNTY TITLE COMPANY; 
that plaintiffs NORRIS are entitled to the whole of said sum, 
... and that plaintiffs KEELER and CHANCE ... are entitled 
to be paid one-half (%) of said sum." 
Defendant Emil J. Ribarsky filed an affidavit in opposition 
to the motion for summary judgment averring the following 
facts: Defendants were induced to make the down payment 
under the terms of the deposit receipt by the promise of plain-
tiffs Keeler and Chance to sen property owned by defendants. 
By this sale of their own property, defendants intended to 
secure the funds necessary to perform their contract with the 
Norrises. Plaintiffs Keeler and Chance did not, however, 
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effect a sale of defendants' property, and as a result of their 
failure to perform their promise, defendants were damaged 
in the sum of $2,000. 
It appears from the judgment roll in the previous action 
that after the Ribarskys' refusal to perform their contract, 
plaintiffs Norris brought an action for damages for breach 
of contract. The Ribarskys filed a cross-complaint against 
the Norrises and Keeler and Chance. They alleged that they 
had been induced to enter into the contract as a result of 
fraudulent promises by Keeler and Chance that they would 
sell property owned by the Ribarskys to enable the latter to 
purchase the Norris property. They further alleged that it 
was understood that the contract between the Norrises and 
Ribarskys would be void if Keeler and Chance were unable to 
sell the Ribarsky property, and that the down payment would 
then be refunded to the Ribarskys. The cross-complaint also 
pleaded a cause of action against Keeler and Chance for 
breach of contract to sell the Ribarsky property. ,/ 
The trial court in the previous action entered judgment for 
defendants Ribarsky on the complaint for damages for ' 
breach of contract on the ground that plaintiffs failed to prove 
that they suffered any damage as a result of the breach. It 
entered judgment against the Ribarskys and in favor of the 
Norrises and Keeler and Chance on the cross-complaint, based 
on findings that the allegations with respect to the collateral 
agreement to sell the Ribarsky property were not true. The 
judgment failed to make any disposition of the $2,000 that 
had been deposited with the San Mateo County Title Company. 
[1] It is clear from the judgment in the previous action 
that plaintiffs Norris have no right to recover damages from 
defendants for breach of contract, and that defendants have 
no right to damages against plaintiffs Keeler and Chance and 
no right to restitution against plaintiffs Norris. The rights 
of all the parties were put in issue and litigated. The judg-
ment entered, having become final, conclusively establishes 
that none of the parties is entitled to any recovery against 
any of the others. (Sutphin v. Speik, 15 Ca1.2d 195, 201-203 
[99 P.2d 652, 101 P.2d 497] ; Bernhard v. Bank of America, 
19 Ca1.2d 807, 813 [122 P .2d 892] ; Code Civ. Proc., § 1908.) 
[2] The previous judgment did not adjudicate the title 
to the $2,000 down payment held by the San Mateo County 
Title Company. Since it did determine, however, that none 
of the parties was entitle<.l to 1'pcover from any of the others, 
it is clear that whoever had title to the deposit at the time of 
j 
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the previous action still retains that title and may recover 
the money from the title company. 
[3] Under the standard form of escrow instructions, which 
provide for the exchange of money and a deed upon stipu-
lated conditions, the vendee retains title to the money until 
the conditions have been performed. (H~"ldebrand v. Beck, 
196 Cal. 141, 145-146 [236 P. 301, 39 A.L.R. 1076) ; Kellogg 
v. Ourry, 101 Cal.App.2d 856, 859 [226 P.2d 381); Hast-
ings v. Bank of America, 79 Cal.App.2d 627, 629 [180 P.2d 
358].) [4] In the present ease, however, the down pay-
ment was not deposited in escrow by the vendees pursuant to 
escrow instructions. It was paid to the vendors' agents pursu-
ant to the deposit receipt as the initial payment to the vendors 
in performance of the contract, and title to it vested in the 
vendors when they accepted the contract. (Tuso v. Green, 
194 Cal. 574, 583 [229 P. 327); Kellogg v. Ourry, 101 Cal. 
App.2d 856, 860 [226 P.2d 381]; Landfield v. Oohen, 89 
Cal.App.2d 177, 179 [200 P.2d 149].) [5] Since any right 
the vendees may have had to recover the excess of the down 
payment over the damages caused by their breach is fore-
closed by the previous judgment, the vendors may retain the 
entire down payment. 
[6] t The summary judgment is erroneous, however, in 
awarding plaintiffs a personal judgment against defendants 
Ribarsky for $2,000. Just as the previous judgment foreclosed 
any right of the Ribarskys to recover from the plaintiffs, it 
also foreclosed any right of plaintiffs to recover from them. 
The judgment must accordingly be modified to provide that 
plaintiffs recover from the San Mateo County Title Company 
the sum of $2,000 and that defendants Ribarsky have no right, 
title or interest in said sum held by the San Mateo County 
Title Company. As so modified the judgment is affirmed. 
Each side is to bear its own costs on this appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied June 14, 
1951 . 
